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Abstract
Icard et al. introduce a semantics for actions over
time, provide an axiomatization for this logic, and use
this logic to define coherence conditions for a belief-
intention database. First, we show incompleteness of
their axiomatization and we adapt their semantics and
provide a complete axiomatization for it. Second, we
show that Icard et al.’s definition of coherence is too
weak, and we define a stronger notion of coherence us-
ing our new logic.
Introduction
Shoham (2009) identifies the psychological, social and ar-
tifactual perspectives from which theories of intention are
considered. When considering how to formalize intention
– or any other complex natural notion – these perspec-
tives provide “the yardsticks by which one would evaluate
the theory” (Shoham 2009, p.3). Each perspective “drives
the formal theory of intention and its interaction with be-
lief” (Shoham 2009, p.2), and leads to an approach to for-
malizing mental state. Shoham observes that the artifactual
perspective can be instantiated in many ways. He explores
a particular class of instantiations, which he deems useful
in the context of intention, and he calls this the database
perspective. Shoham then introduces the belief-intention
database, capturing specific interactions between beliefs and
intentions. The database is used by a planner that is engaged
in some form of practical reasoning and stores its inten-
tions and beliefs respectively in an intention database and
a belief database. Shoham suggests that, besides the stan-
dard functionality of storage and retrieval, the belief and in-
tention databases should satisfy the following three consis-
tency conditions: First, the belief database is internally con-
sistent. Secondly, the intention database is internally consis-
tent. Thirdly, the belief database and the intention database
are mutually consistent.
Icard et al. (2010) formalize the belief-intention database
by introducing a semantics for actions over time and an
axiomatization for this logic. They claim that this logic
is sound and strongly complete but omit proofs. A belief
database is a set of formulas from this logic and an intention
Copyright c© 2015, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
database is a set of actions over time. Coherence between
the belief and intention database is expressed syntactically
by a formula of their logic, as well as semantically. They
use these coherence conditions to define AGM-like revision
postulates, for which they provide a representation theorem.
As we will show in the next section, the logic of Icard et
al. is incomplete. This leads to the following three research
questions:
1. Which axioms must be added to the logic of Icard et al. to
obtain completeness?
2. How to (minimally) adapt the logic of action and time to
deal with the incompleteness?
3. How to formalize the consistency conditions between be-
liefs and intentions?
We show that in order to obtain completeness, it is nec-
essary to change the syntax of the logic of Icard et al. We
correct their logic and obtain a branching time logic con-
taining a modal operator t such that tϕ means “the agent
believes that it is necessary that ϕ at time moment t”. We
formalize the intention database using discrete atomic ac-
tion intentions of the form (a, t), which stands for “the agent
intends to do a at time t”. We then show that the coherence
condition proposed by Icard et al. is too weak and we pro-
pose a stronger version.
Our methodology is similar to Icard et al.’s, namely to
develop a logic that is suitable to be used for AGM style
revision of beliefs and intentions. Therefore, the logic should
be as simple and as close to propositional logic as possible.
The success criteria of this approach is future work, where
we study the revision of both beliefs and intentions such that
the consistency conditions remain satisfied.
Figure 1: The Belief-Intention Database
Figure 1 gives a visual overview of the belief-intention
database. The solid arrows depict the addition or removal of
beliefs and intentions. The dashed arrows depict consistency
conditions between elements. In this paper, we study how to
formalize beliefs, the intentions, and the dashed arrows. We
leave the solid arrows to future work.
The layout of this paper follows the research questions
and is as follows: In the first section we introduce the belief-
intention database and the axiomatization issues with Icard
et al. In the second section we introduce our logic and we
show that is sound and strongly complete. In the third sec-
tion we show that Icard et al.’s definition of coherence is too
weak and we propose a stronger version.
The Belief-Intention Database
Shoham proposes the Belief-Intention Database, which con-
sists of a planner, in particular of the sort encountered in so-
called “classical” AI planning (Weld 1999) that is engaged
in some form of practical reasoning. The planner posits a
set of actions to be taken at various times in the future in an
intention database, and updates this database as it continues
with its deliberations. Shoham considers so-called discrete
atomic action intentions of the form “I intend to take action
a at time t”, where a belongs to a fixed set of atomic ac-
tions and t is an integer. Such atomic action intentions can be
extended in various ways (see Shoham (2009) for a discus-
sion), but Shoham focuses on atomic action intentions since
he believes they are the basic building block for the more
complex constructs and these basic actions already contain
nontrivial complications.
Example 1. We now introduce the running example that
we will use throughout the rest of the paper. Suppose that
a household agent is planning tasks for the day. The first in-
tention that it forms is to fetch the newspaper for its owner at
time 0, after which it will bring the newspaper to the owner
at time 1. Finally, the agent plans to make a breakfast con-
taining ham and eggs for its owner at time 2, this breakfast is
called “breakfast 1”, or simply “bf1”. Formally, the agent’s
intention base I contains {( f etch,0),(bring,1),(b f 1,2)}.
Planners usually associate pre-and postconditions with
atomic actions, which respectively denote the execution con-
ditions and the effects of actions. Therefore, Shoham argues
that the database must represent both beliefs and intentions.
Shoham proposes the following consistency conditions that
must be satisfied by the database:
(C1) Beliefs must be internally consistent.
(C2) At most one action can be intended for any given time
moment.
(C3) If you intend to take an action, you believe that its post-
conditions hold.
(C4) If you intend to take an action you cannot believe that its
preconditions do not hold.
Note that (C3) and (C4) contain a certain asymmetry.
Shoham motivates this by stating that “(. . . ) only at the con-
clusion of planning– and sometimes not even then– are all
these preconditions established. (. . . ) it is a good fit with
how planners operate. Adopting an optimistic stance, they
feel free to add intended actions so long as those are con-
sistent with current beliefs, but once they do they continue
acting based on the assumption that these actions will be
taken, with all that follows from it.” (Shoham 2009, p.7-8).
Icard et al. (2010) formalize Shoham’s belief-intention
database using a paths semantics for actions over time to
model the belief database, and they define a notion of “ap-
propriate sets of paths”. This intuitively means that if an
agent believes the precondition of some action at time t, then
the agent considers it possible that it carries out this action.
They characterize the appropriateness condition with the fol-
lowing axiom:
pre(a)t → ♦do(a)t (1)
The following proposition shows that this axiom does not
capture the semantics correctly.
Proposition 1. Equation (1) is not sound for the semantics
of Icard et al. (2010).
This already means that the axiomatization of Icard et al.
is not correct. We prove even more.
Proposition 2. The logic of Icard et al. (2010) is not com-
pact.
The next corollary follows directly.
Corollary 1. There is no finitary1 sound and complete
axiomatization for the syntax and semantics of Icard et
al. (2010).
This means that it is not possible to correct the axiomati-
zation of Icard et al., while maintaining the syntax. This is
not surprising if consider that all propositions of their logics
are parameterized by a time point, while the modality is not.
This prevents one to express semantically the property that
precondition for an action a in t should enable execution of
the action a in t.
This motivates us to change the syntax of Icard et al. by
replacing their modality  with a parameterized version t .
In the next section, we present the logic with this modified
syntax and we show that our logic is sound and strongly
complete with respect to a tree semantics.
The Logic
Definition 1 (Language). Let A = {a,b,c, . . .} be a finite
set of deterministic primitive actions and P = {p,q,r, . . .}∪⋃
a∈A{pre(a), post(a),do(a)} be a finite set of propositions,
such that P and A are disjoint. The language L is induc-
tively defined by the following BNF grammar
ϕ ::= χt |tϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ
with χ∈ P and t ∈Z. We abbreviate ¬¬ with ♦, and define
⊥≡ p∧¬p and >≡ ¬⊥.
Example 2. The following formulas are syntactically cor-
rect in our language: ¬sunday0 → do( f etch)0 (if it is not
sunday at time 0, then fetch the newspaper), do(bring)1
(bring the newspaper at time 1), 0(do(b f1)3 ∨ do(b f2)3)
(it is necessary at time 0 that either breakfast 1 or breakfast
2 is prepared at time 3), ♦0 pre( f etch)0 (it is possible that
the precondition to fetch the newspaper is true at time 0).
1Without infinitely long formulas and infinitary rules of infer-
ence
The semantics are similar to CTL*, namely a branching
time structure, where branches are sequences of states. This
general structure can be constrained in various ways, leading
to different kinds of semantics such as the trees, bundles, or
complete bundles (see (Reynolds 2002) for an overview of
different kinds of semantics). We choose the first semantics
and use a tree frame, which is a single tree containing nodes
and edges connecting the nodes.
Definition 2 (Tree frame). A tree frame is a pair (S,R)
where S =
⋃
n∈Z Sn is the union of disjoint sets of states (i.e.
Si ∩ S j = /0 for any i, j ∈ Z, i 6= j), each Si containing a set
of states at time i, and R is an accessibility relation with the
following properties:
1. R⊆⋃n∈Z Sn×Sn+1
2. R is serial: (∀s ∈ S).((∃s′ ∈ S).(sRs′))
3. For each s ∈ S, the past is linearly ordered by R:
(∀s ∈ S).((∃1s′ ∈ S).(s′Rs))
4. R is connected: (∀s,s′ ∈ S).((∃s′′ ∈ S).(s′′R∗s∧ s′′R∗s′)),
where R∗ is the transitive closure of R.
The intuition of tree frames is as follows: With each inte-
ger i∈Zwe associate a set of states Si such that all these sets
are disjoint. Property 1 of the accessibility relation R states
that it only relates two states at subsequent time points. Prop-
erty 2 and 3 together ensure that R is generating an infinite
tree. Finally, property 4 ensures that this tree is unique.
Next, we add valuations to both the nodes and the edges of
this tree. The valuation of the nodes represent the facts that
hold in that state, and the edges contain actions representing
transitions from one state to another.
Definition 3 (Tree structure). A tree structure is a tuple
T = (S,R,v,a) where (S,R) is a tree frame, v : S→ 2L is
a valuation function from states to sets of propositions, and
a : R→ A is another valuation function from accessibility
relations to actions.
Example 3. Consider the tree in Figure 2. The tree structure
T = (S,R,v,a) consists of states S = S0∪ . . .∪S3 with S0 =
{s0},S1 = {s1,s2}, . . . ,S3 = {s5,s6}. The relations are de-
fined as R = {(s0,s1),(s0,s2), . . . ,(s3,s6)} and the valuation
functions v and a are defined such that for instance v(s0) =
{pre( f etch)},v(s3) = {egg, post(bring)} and a((s0,s1)) =
f etch,a((s1,s3)) = bring, and a((s1,s4)) = wait.
Next, we define a notion of a path, which is a trace
through the tree on which formulas are evaluated.
Definition 4 (Path). Given a tree structure T = (S,R,v,a),
a path pi = (s0,s1, . . .) in T is a sequence of states such that
(st ,st+1)∈ R. We write pit to refer to the t’th state of the path
pi and we thus write v(pit) and a(pit) to refer respectively to
the propositions true and the next action on path pi at time t.
Definition 5 (Path equivalence). Two paths pi and pi′ are
equivalent up to time t, denoted pi ∼t pi′, if and only if they
contain the same states up to and including time t and the
same actions up to time t, i.e. pi ∼t pi′ iff. (∀t ′ ≤ t).(pit ′ =
pi′t ′)∧ (∀t ′ < t).(a(pi, t ′) = a(pi′, t ′)).
Note that path equivalence is defined on states, so two
paths may describe exactly the same situation up to and in-
cluding t (i.e. the same valuation), but they still may not be
equivalent.
Figure 2: Example Model
Example 4. The tree in Figure 2 contains four paths, namely
pi1 = (s0,s1, . . . ,s5),pi2 = (s0,s1, . . . ,s6),pi3 = (s0,s1,s4),
and pi4 = (s0,s2). Paths are equivalent up to the moment
where they describe the same situation, so we have for in-
stance pi1 ∼t pi2 for t ≤ 2, pi2 ∼t pi3 for t ≤ 1, and pi3 ∼t pi4
for t ≤ 0.
As the language in Definition 1 already made clear, the
logic contains propositions that are explicitly indexed with
the state at which they hold, where states are identified with
integers. For instance, the formula pt denotes that the propo-
sition p is true at time t. Unlike most other branching time
logics, formulas are not evaluated in a state on a path, but
simply on a path as a whole. So, a model for a formula is
pair of a tree and a path in this tree on which the formula is
true. This, together with some additional constraints related
to the pre-and postconditions of actions, is our definition of
a (pointed) model.
Definition 6 (Model). A pointed model, or simply a model
is a pair (T,pi) where T = (S,R,v,a) is a tree structure sat-
isfying the following conditions:
1. If a(pit) = a, then post(a) ∈ v(pit+1).
2. If pre(a) ∈ v(pit), then there is some pi′ in T with pi′ ∼t pi
and a(pi′t) = a.
and pi is a path in T . We denote models with m1,m2, . . . and
sets of models with M1,M2, . . . We denote the set of all mod-
els withM .
The first condition denotes that if an action is selected as
the next action on the path, then in the next state of this path
the post-condition of this action should be true. The second
action denotes that if the pre-condition of an action is true,
then the agent should consider it possible that this action is
in fact executed (i.e. there exist a path equivalent with the
current path at which the action is carried out).
Example 5. The tree structure of Figure 2 satisfies all of the
conditions of Definition 6, so this is a model for each path in
the tree. For instance (M,pi1) is a model (where pi1 as defined
in the previous example), because we have (among others)
pre( f etch) ∈ v(pi0), so there should be some pi′ ∼0 pi1 such
that a(pi′)0 = f etch. This is the case, since a(pi1) = f etch
and clearly pi1 ∼t pi1 for any t.
Definition 1 indicates that the language uses the time-
indexed modality t . The reason that this modality is in-
dexed with a time point is because formulas are not evalu-
ated in a state, but on a branch. Therefore, one should ex-
plicitly specify up to what point branches are equivalent.
Definition 7 (Truth definitions). Let m = (T,pi) be a model
with T = (S,R,v,a):
T,pi |= pt iff p ∈ v(pit) for any p ∈L
T,pi |= do(a)t iff a(pit) = a
T,pi |= ¬ϕ iff T,pi 6|= ϕ
T,pi |= ϕ∧β iff T,pi |= ϕ and T,pi |= β
T,pi |=tϕ iff (∀pi′).(pi∼t pi′→ T,pi′ |= ϕ)
Note that throughout the paper we use T,pi |=ϕ and m |=ϕ
interchangeably. We have used the first notation in the above
definition to emphasize the fact that formulas are evaluated
in tree structures on paths, but we will mostly use the second
notation in what follows since it is more concise. Validity,
satisfiability and semantic consequence are defined as usual.
Example 6. In Figure 2 (using paths pi1, . . . ,pi4 from
the previous example), the following are true: T,pi1 |=
pre( f etch)0 ∧ do( f etch)0, i.e. at time 0 the precondition
of f etch is true and the agent also carries out this action.
T,pi2 |= 1egg2 holds as well, since at time 1 on path pi2, it
holds that on all paths equivalent with pi2 the formula egg
is true at time 2 (i.e. it is true in state s3 and state s4). Fi-
nally, T,pi1 |= ♦0do(wait)1 ∧♦0do(b f1)2 holds as well, but
T,pi1 |= ♦0(do(wait)1∧do(b f1)2) does not hold.
Definition 8 (The logic PBTL). The logic PBTL consists of
the following axiom schemas and rules:
1. Propositional tautologies





7. χ→tχ, where χ ∈ {pt , pre(a)t , post(a)t}
8. ♦tχ→ χ, where χ ∈ {pt , pre(a)t , post(a)t}
9. do(a)t →t+1do(a)t




12. do(a)t →∧b 6=a¬do(b)t
13. do(a)t → post(a)t+1
14. pre(a)t → ♦tdo(a)t
15. ♦t(do(a)t ∧ϕ)→t(do(a)t → ϕ)
16. Necessitation: from ϕ, infer tϕ, where t ∈ Z
17. Modus Ponens
Axiom 2-5 together define the -operator as an S5 equiv-
alence relation. Axiom 6-8 together state that everything that
is true at a time will necessarily be true in all future time
points. Note that these three axioms together imply χ→t ′χ
with t ′ ≥ t. Axiom 9 and 10 state that an action that is (not)
executed will necessarily be (not) executed on all equiva-
lent branches after executing it. Axiom 11 and 12 together
state that for every time point, the agent believes it carries
out a single action. Axiom 13 states that the agent believes
the postconditions of the actions that it believes it will carry
out, and Axiom 14 state that if the preconditions of an action
are true, the agent believes that it is possible that he will in
fact carry out the action. Axiom 15 enforces deterministic
actions: It is not possible to have two relation from the same
state with the same action.
Theorem 1. The logic PBTL is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of all models.
Definition 9 (Models of (sets of) formulas). Given a PBTL-
formula ϕ and a model m = (T,pi), we say that m is a model
for ϕ iff. m |= ϕ. We denote the set of all models for ϕ with
Mod(ϕ), i.e. Mod(ϕ) = {m | m |= ϕ}. By abuse of notation,
we denote the set of all models for a set of formulas Σ with
Mod(Σ) as well, i.e. Mod(Σ) =
⋂
ϕ∈ΣMod(ϕ).
Now that we have defined all the elements of our frame-
work, we gather them together in our definition of an agent.
Note that the agent does not contain the planner, since this
is not part of our representation.
Definition 10 (Agent). The consequence of a set of PBTL-
formulas Σ is defined as Cn(Σ) = {ϕ | Σ ` ϕ}. An agent A =
(B, I) consists of:
1. A belief database B: A set of PBTL-formulas closed under
consequence, i.e. B =Cn(B);
2. An intention database I: A set of intentions of the form
(a, t) with a ∈ A and t ∈ Z such that no two intentions
occur at the same time point, i.e. if {(a, t),(a′, t ′)} ⊆ I,
then t 6= t ′.
Note that our definition of a belief database is not in line
with the belief revision literature. In their terminology, a be-
lief base is a set of ground facts not necessarily closed under
consequence, while a belief set is always closed under con-
sequence. We have chosen to use belief databases because
this is in line with the database perspective.
Definition 11 (Agent Model). Given an agent A = (B, I),
the agent model of A is (Mod(B), I).
The Consistency Conditions
In this section, we formalize consistency conditions (C1)-
(C4) that were introduced in the second section. The first
two conditions follow directly from our framework.
(C1) Beliefs must be internally consistent. B is consistent.
(C2) At most one action can be intended for any given time
moment. This is ensured by the definition of an intention
database in Definition 10. Note that in our framework the
agent can also not believe to intend more than one ac-
tion at any given time moment due to Axiom 12 of Def-
inition 8, stating that at each time point, the agent only
believes that it does a single action. In fact, together with
Axiom 11 this is equivalent to the constraint that the agent
believes that it carries out exactly one action at each time
moment.
For the last two consistency conditions, namely the ones
characterizing consistency between beliefs and intention, we
require additional constraints on our framework.
(C3) If you intend to take an action, you believe that its post-
conditions hold. As a first try, we may translate this state-





However, this solution suffers from the well-known “Lit-
tle Nell” problem, identified by McDermott (1982)
and discussed, amongst others, by Cohen and
Levesque (1990): Once a robot forms the intention
to save Nell from the tracks of a train, the deliberation
mechanism will notice that “Nell is going to be mashed”
is no longer true, so the intention is removed because
there is no longer a justification for it.
To deal with these subtleties, we make a distinction
between intention-contingent beliefs, or simply contin-
gent beliefs, and concrete “psychical” beliefs, or non-
contingent beliefs. The intention-contingent beliefs are
similar to the contingent beliefs by Icard et al. (2010) and
the notion of weak beliefs by van der Hoek and Wool-
ridge (2003). Non-contingent beliefs concern the world
as it is and what the pre-and postconditions of actions
are, independent of the agent’s plans about the future. The
contingent beliefs, on the other hand, are the beliefs that
the agents has, dependent on the success of her actions
and the action of the agents in shared collective inten-
tions. Thus, the contingent beliefs are derived from the
non-contingent beliefs, simply adding the post-conditions
(and all consequences) of any intended actions and collec-
tively intended actions. These kinds of beliefs might also
be called “optimistic” beliefs, since the agent assumes the
success of the action without ensuring the preconditions
hold. We denote the contingent beliefs by BI :
BI =Cl(B∪{post(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I})
Given our discussion above, we interpret Shoham’s
consistency condition as: If you intend to take an action,
you believe that its postconditions hold contingently.
This is equivalent to requiring that the contingent beliefs
of an agent are consistent, so our formalisation of this
consistency condition is: BI is consistent.
(C4) If you intend to take an action you cannot believe that its
preconditions do not hold. This condition is formalized





Although their semantics is slightly different from ours,
the general idea of this formula is clear: There exists a
path, equivalent with the current path up to time 0, in
which all the preconditions of the intended actions hold.
The following example shows that this definition is too
weak.
Example 7 (Coherence). Assume the robot has the inten-
tion base I = {( f etch,0),(bring,1),(b f1,2)} and that it
has the model that is depicted in Figure 3, in which the
Figure 3: Example Model m1
path with the bold arrows is the path pi of the model of the
agent. In this model m1, on the other path, all precondi-
tions of the intended action are true, even though none of
the intended actions are carried out on this path.
This is clearly too weak. An agent may believe that all the
preconditions hold on a paths where none of its intended
actions are carried out. In order to resolve this, we require
that the beliefs of an agent should be consistent with the
preconditions of it’s intended action. So, the agent does
not have to believe the preconditions of its intended ac-
tions, but he should not believe the negation of the pre-
condition of an intended action. Therefore, we introduce






We can then express the condition as follows: Pre(BI) is
consistent.
If our formal condition of (C4) is satisfied, then the formal
condition for (C3) is satisfied as well, so we can obtain the
following definition of coherence:
Definition 12 (Coherence). An agent A = (B, I) is coherent
iff. Pre(BI) is consistent.
An agent model (Mod(B), I) is coherent iff there exists
some m ∈Mod(B) : m |= Pre(BI).
Example 8 (Coherence, ctd.). Given the new definition of
coherence, it follows that the agent of our previous exam-
ple is not longer coherent. For instance, it has the intention
(bring,1), but it also follows that m1 6|= pre(bring)1. Since
m1 is the only model of the agent, the agent is not coherent.
Discussion and Conclusion
We show that we cannot axiomatize the logic of Icard et al.,
which motivates us to alter the syntax by replacing modali-
ties with time-parameterized modalities. We prove that this
logic is sound and strongly complete wrt. a tree semantics.
We show that the coherence condition of Icard et al. is too
weak and proposed a stronger version.
A large number of logical systems have been developed
for reasoning about informational and motivational attitudes
in dynamic environments, mostly following the paper of Co-
hen and Levesque (1990) (see Meyer and Veltman (2007)
and van der Hoek and Woolridge (2003) for surveys). Most
of these logics focus on the process of intention generation
(e.g. practical reasoning) and the question of how to model
the persistence of intentions over time (see Herzig and
Lorini (2008) for a survey). The approach of Shoham (2009)
and Icard et al. (2010), namely how an agent should re-
vise its beliefs and intentions together given new informa-
tion or a change of plans, has received relatively little atten-
tion (Van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2003; Lorini et al. 2009;
Roy 2009). Broadly speaking, the logical framework we use
in this paper falls into the category of the so-called “BDI-
logics”, in the sense that we model an agent using the mental
states of belief and intention (we leave out desires).
Our semantics is close to CTL*, the branching-time mod-
els of Rao and Georgeff (1991). However, one important dif-
ference is that we focus on the intention to perform an action
at a specific moment in time. The benefits of this are dis-
cussed by Shoham (2009). In this paper, plans are not explic-
itly part of the framework, but, as a feature of the database
perspective, are conceived of in the background as a recipe
describing precisely what actions the agent will perform at
specific moments in time. In the framework for van der Hoek
et al. (2003), a plan describes what needs to be true in order
to fulfill some desire, and consequently they focus on the
problem of revising intentions and beliefs in the presence of
new information and less on the effect on beliefs of adopting
new intentions.
We see three main directions for future work. Firstly, we
would like to investigate the coherence condition in more de-
tail, containing more involved examples. Although our cur-
rent version is stronger than the one of Icard et al., it does
no longer make use of a modal operator. This seems quite
strong, and we would like to investigate whether other ver-
sion as possible. Secondly, now that we have provided a cor-
rect axiomatization for our logic, we would like to study the
revision of beliefs and intentions. Icard et al. provide a rep-
resentation theorem in their paper as well, but again omit
proofs. We would like to see whether this theorem holds in
our setting. Finally, we deem it interesting to add goals to
our framework as well. BDI logics usually consider beliefs,
desires or goals, and intentions. It thus seems a logical next
step to introduce goals as well.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 1. Equation (1) is not sound for semantics of
Icard et al. (2010).
Proof. Due to space constraints we refer to Icard et
al. (Icard, Pacuit, and Shoham 2010) for the notation we use
in these proofs. Let A = {a,b}, and let pi and pi′ we two paths
satisfying the following conditions:
• pre(a) ∈ pi(1)1 and pre(a) 6∈ pi(t)1 for t 6= 1
• pre(b) 6∈ pi(t)1 for every t
• pi(1)2 = b
• pi′(1)2 = a
• pi∼t pi′
It is easy to check that Π = {pi,pi′} is an appropriate set of
paths. By (Icard, Pacuit, and Shoham 2010, Def.2), pi,2 |=Π
pre(a)1. If Eq. (1) is sound, then pi,2 |=♦do(a)1. So there is
some pi′′ ∈Π such that pi′′ ∼2 pi and pi′′,2 |=Π do(a)1. How-
ever, this is not possible, since Π = {pi,pi′}. If pi′′ = pi, then
pi′′,2 6|=Π do(a)1, and if pi′′ = pi′, then pi′′ 6∼2 pi. Thus, we
conclude that Eq. (1) is not sound.
Proposition 2. The logic of Icard et al. (2010) is not com-
pact.
Proof. Let p be a propositional letter and let T = {pt | t ∈
Z}∪{♦¬pt | t ∈Z}. Every finite subset T ′ of T is satisfiable.
Indeed, suppose that t ′ is the smallest time index that appears
in any formula of T ′, and let t0 be any integer such that t0 <
t ′. Let Π = {pi1,pi2}, where pi1 and pi2 are arbitrary paths
such that p∈ pi1(t)1 for every t ∈Z, and p∈ pi2(t)1 iff t ≤ t0.
Then Π,pi1, t0 |= T ′.
On the other hand, T is not satisfiable. If we suppose that
there are Π,pi, t ′ such that Π,pi, t ′ |= T , then obviously p ∈
pi(t)1 for every t ∈ Z. Let t0 be any integer such that t0 <
t ′. Since Π,pi, t ′ |= ♦¬pt ′ , there is a path pi′ ∈ Π such that
pi′ ∼t0 pi and Π,pi′, t ′ |= ¬pt ′ . This is impossible, since pi′ ∼t0
pi implies that p ∈ pi′(t ′)1, while Π,pi′, t ′ |= ¬pt ′ implies that
p /∈ pi′(t ′)1. Consequently, the Compactness theorem doesn’t
hold for the logic. Hence, it follows that the logic is non-
compact.
Theorem 1. The logic PBTL is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of all pointed models.
Proof. The proof is given in a separate technical report (Do-
der and van Zee 2014).
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